Private Military And Security Companies Research Articles

Selling security to Africa: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and the fate of African intrastate security

ABSTRACT The increasing demand for privatised security has rekindled significant attention to private military and security companies (PMSCs) in international relations and security discourse. Focusing on the Wagner Group, the overarching purpose of this work is to explore PMSCs in Africa to examine the consequences of their operations on the fate of the continent’s security. How may PMSCs such as Wagner’s operations and competitions with the traditional powers influence Africa’s security environment? We attempt to demonstrate how Wagner’s expanding footprint in Africa may create conditions for political violence and civil conflicts in Africa. Situating this analysis in the existing literature, we argue that the growing that the growing foothold of the Group and their readiness to compete with Western powers in Africa on behalf of Russia may reinforce states-citizens tensions, widen existing gaps between governments and citizens and radicalise and militarise citizens to drive political violence and civil conflicts. We base the methodological analysis on the qualitative technique and situate the theoretical argument in the contentious politics theoretical framework.

Insecurity, Counterterrorism and the Use of Private Military and Security Companies in Nigeria: A Qualitative Study

Insecurity and terrorism pose significant concerns in Nigeria. Yet, there is a paucity of research on citizens’ and private security providers’ (PSP) perceptions of Nigeria’s response to insecurity and the use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). The study adopts a qualitative approach, and data was collected using semi-structured interviews with 63 participants, including PSP, non-governmental organisations and lay participants from the public and private sectors in Nigeria. Thematic analysis from a social constructionist theoretical lens was used to analyse the data. The study found a lack of confidence in the Nigerian security forces, scepticism towards the perceived government’s insincere politicisation of military victory, positive reinforcement of the use of private military companies devoid of identity, ‘othering’, and perceived short-term use of private military security. It also found a perceived mistrust for government approaches in handling insecurity and a positive outlook towards involving PMSCs and mercenaries in combating terrorism regardless of the participants’ identities as Nigerians. In conclusion, the study recommends the need for policies to strengthen Nigerian security agencies to avoid a perceived trust for PMSCs instead of state security.

Wagner Group: Comparing and contextualizing the Russian monster

Though the same descriptors have been applied to Wagner Group and US/Western Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), this article differentiates the two experiences to better appreciate Wagner Group’s unique characteristics. To make this differentiation, the article examines the distinctions between defensive and offensive violence, the access to crewed weapons, and an integrated team approach. In this way, the article presents Wagner Group as offensively minded, kitted out with crewed weapons, and operating outside of an integrated team. The article closes with resulting questions to consider regarding Russia’s stance toward weaponry and how Wagner Group’s characteristics might have contributed to the June 2023 uprising.

A Case Study of Gorkhali: Private Military and Security Companies in Global Security Assemblages

The news about Nepali citizens joining the Russo-Ukraine war has once again sparked attention among stakeholders regarding Gorkhali’s engagement with global private security companies. The engagement of Gorkhali in the Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) is not a new phenomenon; it has been seen since the end of the Cold when it came into existence. As the market of PMSCs rises exponentially, security labourers from countries like Nepal are increasingly joining the same. Gorkhali’s long history of mercenaries and constructed narrative of bravery and loyalty has also attracted PMSCs. Existing literature overlooks the emerging consequence and contradiction of PMSCs-led global security governance to Gorkhali and the complex inter-relationship among PMSCs, client state, Gorkhali, and Nepal. This paper uses the ‘Global Assemblages’ approach to capture multiple actors’ fluid relationships, changes, emerging practices, authority, and institutions. The research looks at consequences and contradictions related to Gorkhali after the 2016 Taliban attack on Nepali security guards and the situation of the same after Afghanistan fell to the Taliban in 2021 while serving for PMSCs. It uses the ‘discourse analysis’ to incorporate books, journal articles, and media interviews of security guards and their families on the research topic. Lastly, research argues that the blurred relation between PMSCs and client states in global security assemblages is not only in the security and military realm but is also seen in the case of taking responsibility for any tragic event/accident of Gorkhali in PMSCs-led global security governance. It is also influencing the local institutions and practices of Nepal.

Private Military and Security Companies as a Legacy of War: Lessons Learned From the Former Yugoslavia

Abstract The war in the former Yugoslavia produced many highly trained and experienced combatants, some of whom engaged not only in a variety of organized criminal activities such as the illicit trade of natural resources, trafficking and corruption, but also war crimes. In the post-war environment various criminal groups took advantage of post-conflict transition conditions which enabled them to be transformed into legitimate legal entities. The failure to investigate and hold to account those involved in criminal activity meant that demobilized soldiers turned to highly profitable, legally constituted private military and security companies (PMSCs). This is coupled with poorly designed security sector reforms that often fail to enhance effective and accountable security that is respectful of human rights. In recent years, similar transformations of many former combatants and criminal groups into legitimate PMSCs around the globe have raised new concerns about their growing activities across different sectors. This article uses the former Yugoslavia as an example from which to highlight some of the increasingly common problems posed by the creation of private military and security providers globally, as a result of the current uncoordinated processes to prevent armed conflicts. The article reflects on the need to avoid smart sanctions and use other foreign policy tools, while calling for an integrated approach to security sector reform and transitional justice that is necessary for sustainable peace.

Profiteers of Misery

Abstract Since its hailing as the ‘supreme international crime’ during the Nuremberg Trials, aggression has largely been neglected relative to other core international crimes. However, the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War starting in early 2022 is being held as an opportunity to breathe new life into this de facto dormant norm. This article seeks to address novel concerns as to the scope of liability permitted by the crime of aggression, which arise from Russia’s enthusiastic use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in this conflict. It first overviews the relevant terminology applicable to the use of private armed personnel. It then asserts the value of pursuing accountability for both aggression and PMSCs. The article continues by evaluating the requirements of aggression’s ‘leadership element’, which seeks to restrict liability to high-level leaders. As an illustrative case study, it applies this to the Wagner Group’s military operations in Ukraine. This article confirms that senior corporate officers of PMSCs may, in principle, satisfy the leadership requirement of aggression, opening up the door for their liability and urging closer scrutiny of such matters.

Interstitial emergence of national defence entrepreneurial firms and re-configuration of the state as a defence actor: the case of Sweden’s Vesper Group

ABSTRACT Does growing reliance on private military and security companies (PMSCs) lead to the re-configuration of the state as a security and defence actor in Europe? Building on the multiple-networks-approach in organisation theory (Padgett and Powell), the current paper develops an analytical approach for studying the rise of new organizational forms in interstitial spaces via mechanisms including extension and differentiation; fusion and hybridity; transposition and refunctionality; and multivocality. The empirical analysis focuses on the rules and practices of Vesper Group - a PMSC working closely with the Swedish government. Several findings are reported. First, a new organizational form seems to be emerging as a result of the ongoing multiple network dynamics – national defence entrepreneurial firm. This is a type of a firm different from mainstream PMSCs in that it is owned by venture capital companies from their home state and also in that it is closely associated with its respective state in terms of its personnel policies, expertise and operational goals and scope. Second, the case of Sweden’s Vesper Group and its cooperation with the Swedish government indicates that some EU member states may also be in the process of structural and institutional mutation as providers of defence and crisis management capabilities.

State Sovereignty and Private Military and Security Companies in Australia

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) as active participants within global security environments has increased in the last two decades exponentially. States have progressively incorporated PMSCs in their security functions, both domestically and internationally. Since the conflict in Iraq in the early 2000s, there have been numerous plausible reports of PMSCs violating international humanitarian law. Despite this, only a few have ever been prosecuted, suggesting a fundamental challenge to understandings regarding state control and monopoly over violence. Utilising a historical case study of an Australian PMSC in Operation Iraqi Freedom, this article argues that PMSCs undermine Australian sovereign legitimacy. It demonstrates how Australian oversight and accountability regarding its use of PMSCs is significantly fractured and current regulatory mechanisms concerning PMSCs are deficient. Thus, the Australian government's ability to provide control over the actions of PMSCs is diminished, affecting its sovereign legitimacy and ability to monopolise violence. The article overall conveys the dubious position states come into when the use‐of‐force is wielded by actors for distinct material incentives.

Is someone’s mercenary another’s contractor? American, British, and Russian private security companies in US and UK parliamentary debates

Scholars disagree on whether an anti-mercenary norm exists, whether today’s private military and security companies (PMSCs) fall under its scope, and whether the privatization of security erode parliamentary control over the use of force. We contribute to these debates by conducting a content analysis of parliamentary debates on PMSCs in the UK and US (2001–2019). Our results show that American and British politicians engage in a vehement, bipartisan criticism of Russian PMSCs, whose employees are consistently stigmatized as ruthless mercenaries irrespective of the activities they perform. Criticism of their own government’s use of PMSCs, by contrast, is more nuanced and largely made by liberal and social democratic politicians only. These findings support the argument that an anti-mercenary norm narrowly focused on for-profit providers of combat still exists, but also highlights that its interpretation is biased by nationalism and politico-economic preferences, which shape the frequency and nature of politicians’ stigmatization of private security providers

Private military and security companies and human rights abuses: The impact of CEOs’ military background

This study examines how military background of chief executive officers (CEOs) of private military and security companies (PMSCs) that intervened in Iraq from 2003 to 2019 affected the frequency with which companies committed human rights abuses. My findings show that PMSCs with CEOs who served in the military, for any regime type, are more likely to commit a high number of human rights abuses than companies led by CEOs without service experience. The risk is higher for PMSCs with CEOs who served in the Navy and lowest for CEOs with experience in the Air Force. The risk increases when ex-military CEOs lead private rather than publicly traded companies. The study contributes novel data on military service of CEOs for international PMSCs that were present in Iraq. The data reports on the type of governing system where CEOs served, their service branch, and whether they graduated from military academies/colleges.

Private military security companies in the Middle East and North Africa

The current increase in the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) that have spread significantly both globally and within the MENA region is often viewed through a black and white lens. PMSCs have mainly been looked at through their role in combat operations, while the wide and diverse range of their services such as logistics, intelligence, and security consultation is often ignored or does not get sufficient attention. The array of actors (PMSCs and players who interact with them) and services provided creates a complex picture, making it sometimes hard to grasp the effectiveness of these companies. This article attempts to provide a clearer vision of the effects that the PMSCs have on the overall stability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). By outlining different actors and the main tasks carried out by the PMSCs the article explores whether their presence in the MENA has a negative or positive effect on the security and stability in the region.

Soldiers for Hire: Contextualising the Private Military's Legal Conundrums

The industry surrounding private military and security companies (PMSCs) is a conflict-driven industry. It often operates in regions with a significant security vacuum and a lack of an efficient legal and judicial system. This underscores the importance of effective regulatory oversight that may be international, national, or an amalgamation of both. Currently, the framing and subsequent enforcement of regulations continue to be a challenge due to divergent approaches among various stakeholders. The research paper focuses on the need to develop a consensus and bring accountability to the industry due to its far-reaching consequences. The research was based on analysing the existing regulations and using primary as well as secondary sources to identify legal gaps that impede the process of ensuring accountability from the PMSCs. Furthermore, the paper contextualised the legal ambiguities by taking up case studies of prominent PMSCs that have shaped current regulations. Apart from identifying the legal ambiguities, the research also highlighted the current scope of regulations and remedies in practice. It emphasised the importance of bringing good practises together and adding new dimensions to the definition of a mercenary by promoting better training procedures, effective and detailed vetting processes, and registering both PMSCs and individual contractors.

Uloga paravojnih formacija u savremenim oružanim sukobima - status, dileme i kontroverze

Modern armed conflicts have made paramilitary formations a topical issue, which is thematized in international humanitarian law and national legislations. In addition to existing traditional notions of a mercenary and a foreign fighter, other notions have emerged in recent years, namely the notion of a foreign terrorist fighter and the concept of private military and security companies (PMSC). The aim of this paper is to point out the key problems related to their determination, that is, status, as well as dilemmas and controversies that arise in relation to their legal treatment, including their participation in modern armed conflicts. Based on a review of relevant literature, an analysis of documents, official announcements and media content, four categories of paramilitary formations were presented. As a framework for illustrating the perceived dilemmas and controversies the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Ukraine were used as examples.

Private military and security companies: South Africa’s neglected resource

Using the current conflict in northern Mozambique as a case study, we argue that the South African government and its current legislation on private military and security companies (PMSCs) has prevented it from being a more effective agent for peace in the region. South Africa’s current legislation – the Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998 (FMA) and the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities Act of 2006 (PMA) – creates a situation, a deliberate and intentional one, where PMSCs are unable to operate effectively effectively. Therefore PMSCs do not operate from South Africa, despite South African PMSCs being well regarded and experienced internationally. The FMA and PMA also oppose a general international trend which is seeing increased use and acceptance of PMSCs. We argue that the conflict in northern Mozambique is an example where legislation which is more accepting of the PMSC industry would have allowed South Africa to provide more (and earlier) assistance to Mozambique. This would have helped Mozambique and the region, but, importantly, it would also have been a valuable tool in South Africa’s foreign diplomacy and projected the potential for the use of smart power.

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in the Modern International Processes

The period of rapid growth and development of the phenomenon, that is presently characterized as private military and security companies (PMSCs), coincided with the two processes of modern history of international relations: the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the U.S. Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan. At the same time state attitude towards violence and transformation of warfare has been changing as well. Two diff erent approaches to the history of the private security market’ rise unveil the fact, that, in one way or another, the originators of the private security services were associated with the defense industry and armed forces. Non-state security actors look back on a history, that stretches to the middle and the second half of the 20th century – the period of national liberation movements across the world. Meanwhile, the 90-s of the 20th century marked the fast growth in the number of PMSCs and in the development and enlargement of the private security services’ market. Its growth is ongoing to date with gaining more new states that are interested in utilizing its capacity as an instrument of politics. Against the backdrop of the world political processes the private security market experienced technological growth and enhancement. Together with that, both the normative regulation and the approaches of the international community to the phenomenon of private military and security companies have been evolving and changing. Despite its functionality, fl exibility and technological advantages, the market of private security can challenge human rights as well as bare responsibility for the facts of corruption and improper fulfi llment of contractual obligations. Still the episodes of revealed grieve violations rarely reach courts, with infrequent cases of sentencing the perpetrators to punishment. These and other problems occurring in the private security industry require close attention by the states and international community, which has been making eff orts for elaboration of the applicable normative mechanisms to regulate private military and security activity for more than fi fteen years.

To Buy a War but Sell the Peace? Mercenaries and Post-Civil War Stability

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) and mercenaries are a common feature in civil wars, yet little systematic analysis of PMSC involvement and conflict dynamics exists. This article explores whether civil conflicts that feature PMSC forces in combat are more likely to recur. We contend that the presence of PMSCs in fighting exacerbates the postwar credible commitment problem, as belligerents will be concerned about the possibility to redeploy such forces in the future. Belligerents pay more attention to more recent and more visible information, meaning that the effects should be greatest if PMSCs feature extensively in combat and at the end of the conflict. A duration analysis of data from the Private Security Events Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1990–2014, offers robust support for these claims. Our results suggest that conflict management should consider aspects beyond the local context as risk factors for civil war recurrence.

Private Military and Security Companies and Gendered Human Rights Challenges: Oversight or Blatant Disregard?

It is well documented that the private military and security industry has the capacity to do great gendered harms to both those it encounters and those it employs.1 Significantly, it is also a sector where a variety of human rights-based approaches, instruments and mechanisms have emerged beyond the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).2 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) addresses gender, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and explicitly requires private military and security companies (PMSCs) to integrate a gender perspective in their practices.3 Through an examination of publicly available documents and policies required for PMSCs certified as complying with the ICoC, this piece evaluates whether PMSCs do in fact integrate a gender perspective into their human rights policies and grievance procedures (see Table 1).4 Our study of certified PMSCs demonstrates that despite increased attention to the potential for negative gender impacts in the sector, companies have not developed gender-responsive policies and procedures. It can be said, therefore, that gender is not addressed in any meaningful way by PMSCs. More specifically, we conclude that PMSCs have not yet shown the required holistic understanding of gendered impacts and barriers that is required to respect human rights, and that further efforts are needed in the sector.

Private Military and Security Companies and The Militarization of Humanitarianism

The widespread use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in United Nations peacebuilding missions often undermines the effectiveness of these missions. PMSCs tend to encourage, in unnecessary ways, what is called security risk management and promote the militarization of humanitarian efforts. They encourage humanitarian aid organizations to protect their personnel with barbed wire fences, security guards, armed convoys, and secure aid compounds, even if the security risks are relatively low. Consequently, these militarized humanitarian efforts heighten the perception of risks and intensify security measures, which create physical and psychological barriers between humanitarian aid personnel and the local communities in which they carry out their tasks. This situation undermines local ownership of peacebuilding efforts and makes them less responsive to the local communities involved in these efforts. This article provides a comparative analysis of the nature of this problem and its effects in the Global South.

What does gender got to do with it? PMSCs and privatization of security revisited

ABSTRACT While war and the military have been recognized as being gendered sites, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are only rarely studied through a gender lens. Compared to functional, political-instrumental or ideational explanations with respect to the privatization of security, such a lens captures, however, the micro-dynamic and political processes of PMSCs’ boom. We show that gender is, first, constitutive of companies’ corporate identities as hero warriors and professional security experts. Second, it is relational, (re-)producing hierarchical power relations among and within PMSCs and with state security actors. Third, gender is a legitimizing factor helping PMSCs to establish themselves as acceptable security actors vis-à-vis others.

GOING AGAINST THE TIDE: SEEKING REGULATIONS FOR PRIVATE MILITARY/SECURITY COMPANIES IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

This article discusses the role of privatization of security in Africa, but its focus is on private military and security companies (PMSCs). The article proceeds on the basis that there is need for effective regulatory frameworks for PMSCs that operate in conflict zones of Africa. Thus, it begins by appraising the existing normative standards at the international, regional and domestic level that apply to these companies, and thereafter, identifies their shortcomings in light of the prevailing security conditions within the continent. The article then posits broad theoretical imperatives for designing a more effective regulatory framework for PMSCs and concludes by proposing the establishment an overarching continental regime constructed on the basis of the suggested imperatives.